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III. CONCLUSION .................................. 862THE past few years have been tough for lawyers in Texas specializ-
ing in toxic torts and mass torts. Legislative tort reform, judicial
opinions requiring ever more precise statistical proof of causation
in toxic tort cases, court decisions and statutes disfavoring the class action
as a procedure for resolving claims of tortiously inflicted harms, and the
global economic downturn have inhibited the creativity and enthusiasm
that has long characterized both sides of the toxic and mass tort bar. As a
gauge of new activity involving mass tort litigation in Texas, one need
look no further than the docket of the Texas Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation. In last year's Survey, we reported that the panel consid-
ered no new request to transfer any mass tort cases to a pretrial court for
centralized administration; during the current Survey period, the panel
issued a decision in one case that approached, but did not meet, the com-
monly accepted definition of a mass tort.' As another barometer of the
vitality of toxic and mass tort litigation in Texas, the activity of the Texas
Legislature in its 2009 regular session is revealing. For the first time in
* B.A., Columbia University; J.D., University of Texas. Of Counsel, Baron & Budd,
P.C., Dallas, Texas, and Lecturer in Law on Mass Tort Litigation, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity Dedman School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assis-
tance of Ann Saucer, of counsel, Baron & Budd, P.C.
1. See In re Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass'n Hurricanes Rita & Humberto Litig., No. 08-
0914, 2009 WL 888054, at *4 (Tex. J.P.M.L. Jan. 27, 2009) (transferring claims alleging that
insurer had wrongfully adopted business practice of handling insurance claims that mini-
mized payments to its insured for covered hurricane damage). The claims do not fall
within the classic definition of a mass tort because they do not involve allegations of physi-
cal personal injury or property damage.
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recent memory, the Texas Legislature did not enact, or even consider, any
legislation intended to restrict the prosecution of toxic or mass tort cases
in Texas. 2 Perhaps most telling, for the second year in a row, no Texas
jurisdiction made the list of the American Tort Reform Association's top
six "Judicial Hellholes," although the Texas Gulf Coast and Rio Grande
Valley remained on the organization's "Watch List."3
Undaunted by this bleak environment for toxic and mass tort litigation,
the appellate courts continued to churn out opinions of interest to Texas
practitioners in these areas. The Texas Supreme Court issued opinions on
the availability of forum non conveniens dismissal and the applicability of
tort reform legislation to cases governed by federal common law, and the
Texas courts of appeals issued significant opinions concerning manage-
ment of mass tort litigation and liability of premises owners and employ-
ers for injuries caused by toxic exposures. Most notably, the United
States Supreme Court issued three opinions directly affecting mass and
toxic tort litigation in Texas. These developments confirm that the area
of toxic and mass torts continues to deserve its own chapter in the Annual
Survey of Texas Law.
I. CASE MANAGEMENT AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. BANKRUPTCY
Beginning in the 1980s, corporations with significant mass tort liability
turned to the bankruptcy courts to seek refuge from the burden of ad-
dressing individual tort claims. 4 Although the disadvantages of seeking
bankruptcy protection-the burden of conducting business under court
supervision, the loss of confidence of both customers and creditors, and
the risk of partial or total loss of shareholder equity, to name just three-
are obvious, the potential for achieving a comprehensive resolution of
mass tort liability through bankruptcy has proved too tempting to resist
for some corporate defendants. On the other hand, the mass tort claim-
ants, whose direct claims against the bankrupt defendant are invariably
discounted in bankruptcy, often seek to make up the difference by assert-
ing independent tort claims against other defendants that may be closely
linked to the bankrupt defendant. Those defendants, in turn, often argue
that the protective bankruptcy cloak shielding the initial defendant covers
them too.
2. See Mary Alice Robbins, Winners and Losers of the 81st Session, TEXAs LAWYER,
June 15, 2009 (noting that efforts of supporters of tort reform focused not on enacting new
legislation but on "killing bills that ... would have rolled back reforms"). One of those
bills was Senate Bill 1123, which would have relaxed, in mesothelioma cases, the strict
standards for proving causation announced by the supreme court in Borg-Warner Corp. v.
Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007). Id.
3. See American Tort Reform Association, Judicial Hellholes 2009, available at http://
www.atra.org/reports/hellholes; see also American Tort Reform Association, Judicial Hel-
tholes 2008, available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2008.
4. Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, The Why and The How, 78
AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 93-94 (2004).
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Such was the case in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey,5 decided by the
United States Supreme Court this past term. In 1982, Johns-Manville
Corporation (Manville) filed for protection under Chapter XI of the
United States Bankruptcy Code in the hope of achieving a comprehen-
sive resolution of the thousands of claims against it seeking damages for
personal injury and wrongful death caused by exposure to its asbestos-
containing products. Supporters of Manville's strategy praised the filing
as an innovative blueprint for resolving mass tort liabilities in an organ-
ized, equitable way;6 critics condemned the action as a cynical attempt to
cabin liability and preserve the company's equity at the expense of in-
jured victims.7 In 1986, the bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization
plan that channeled present and future asbestos claims against Manville
to a trust composed largely of stock in the reorganized company and pro-
ceeds from product liability insurance policies that covered the claims.8
In return for the insurers' contributions to the trust, the bankruptcy court
issued an order enjoining the assertion against the insurers of any "and all
claims, demands, allegations, duties, liabilities and obligations" which
were or could have been "based upon, arising out of or relating to any or
all" of the insurance policies.9 The appellate court affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court's orders confirming the reorganization plan and enjoining
the maintenance of claims against the insurers.' 0
Years later, the continued press of asbestos claims forced the Manville
bankruptcy trust to reduce its payments to claimants and caused other
companies implicated in asbestos litigation to seek bankruptcy protec-
tion.1 When denied these sources of compensation, plaintiffs with asbes-
tos claims asserted creative theories of liability against other companies.
Among the new targets was Travelers Indemnity Company, an insurance
company that contributed to the Manville trust. The plaintiffs alleged
that Travelers and other insurers were liable for injuries caused by expo-
sure to Manville asbestos products-separate and independent from their
derivative liability under the insurance policies-for conspiring with
Manville and other manufacturers to conceal from the public the hazards
of asbestos exposure and for developing a fraudulent "state of the art"
presentation to use in defense of their insureds at trial. 12 Travelers, of
course, argued that these "direct actions" against it violated the injunc-
5. 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009).
6. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., ASBESTOS LITI-
GATION 110-11 (2005) (stating the Manville case "created the model for resolving asbestos
personal injury litigation under the protection of bankruptcy").
7. See, e.g., Kathleen W. Meaney, Note, The Asbestos Bankruptcy: Johns-Manville's
Petition for Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code-A Good Faith Fil-
ing or a Sham?, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 55 (1985); Sandrea Friedman, Note, Manville:
Good Faith Reorganization or "Insulated" Bankruptcy, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 121 (1983).
8. Travelers Indem. Co., 129 S. Ct. at 2199.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2200.
11. See James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 223,
263 (2006).
12. Travelers Indem. Co., 129 S. Ct. at 2200.
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tion issued by the Manville bankruptcy court, and it sought an order from
that court "clarifying" that the 1986 order indeed enjoined the actions.' 3
Travelers agreed with three sets of direct action plaintiffs to pay more
than $400 million in settlement to all direct action plaintiffs if such an
order were entered. The bankruptcy court issued the requested "clarify-
ing order," finding that the direct actions against Travelers were "based
upon, arising out of or relating to" the insurance policies issued by Trav-
elers to Manville because "Travelers['] knowledge of the hazards of as-
bestos was derived from its nearly three decade insurance relationship
with Manville and the performance by Travelers of its obligations under
the Policies."14 But some direct action plaintiffs and one co-insurer of
Travelers appealed the clarification order. They argued that the bank-
ruptcy court had no jurisdiction to enjoin actions against Travelers for its
independent liability (i.e., for its liability that did not derive from
Manville's tortious acts). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit agreed, holding that "a bankruptcy court only has jurisdic-
tion to enjoin third-party non-debtor claims that directly affect the res of
the bankruptcy estate." 5
The Supreme Court reversed.16 In an opinion authored by Justice Sou-
ter, the Court first held that the terms of the 1986 order clearly enjoined
the claims.' 7 The Court observed that it would be "possible (but quite a
stretch) to suggest that a 'claim' only relates to Travelers' insurance cov-
erage if it seeks recovery based upon Travelers' specific contractual obli-
gation to Manville."1 8 The Court did note, though, that in also barring
"allegations" relating to the insurance policies, the injunction unambigu-
ously prohibited plaintiffs' actions.19 The Court next addressed the Sec-
ond Circuit's conclusion that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin independent (as opposed to derivative) claims against Manville's
insurers. The Court declined to reach the merits of the holding, stating
that "once the 1986 Orders became final on direct review (whether or not
proper exercises of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and power), they be-
came res judicata to the parties and those in privity with them." 20 The
Court emphasized that its holding did "not resolve whether a bankruptcy
court, in 1986 or today, could properly enjoin claims against nondebtor
insurers that are not derivative of the debtor's wrongdoing." 2 1 Rather, it
held only that "[a]lmost a quarter-century after the 1986 Orders were
entered, the time to prune them is over."22
13. Id. at 2200, 2203.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2202 (quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52, 66 (2d Cir. 2008)).




20. Id. at 2205.
21. Id. at 2207.
22. Id. at 2206.
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, dissented. He asserted that
contrary to the majority's assumption, the 1986 injunction did not by its
terms enjoin claims against insurers for their own misconduct; rather, the
injunction was expanded to include such claims in the 2004 order purport-
ing to clarify the injunction.23 If that were not the case, Justice Stevens
suggested, "surely Travelers would not have paid $445 million" in settle-
ment to the direct action plaintiffs merely "to obtain a redundant piece of
paper." 2 4 Thus, Justice Stevens argued, the attack on the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction to enjoin such claims was not an impermissible collat-
eral attack on the 1986 order but a direct and timely challenge to the 2004
order.25 The independent actions against Travelers, Justice Stevens con-
tinued, had "no effect on the bankruptcy estate, and bankruptcy courts
have no jurisdiction over proceedings that have no effect on the
debtor."26 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded, the bankruptcy court im-
properly enjoined the independent actions against Travelers in its 2004
clarifying order.27
B. DISCOVERY AND TRIAL SETTINGS
In 1999, hundreds of plaintiffs sued more than thirty companies alleg-
ing that chemicals supplied by those companies to pesticide manufactur-
ing facilities operated by the Hayes-Sammons Chemical Company in
Mission, Texas, contributed to a "toxic soup" in the community that
caused the plaintiffs and their family members to develop a wide variety
of injuries.28 More than a decade later, however, none of the cases had
yet to emerge from the pretrial stage. In 2007, in a development reported
in the 2008 Survey, 29 the Texas Supreme Court issued mandamus to va-
cate the trial court's order setting for trial five bellwether cases. This
mandamus occurred before the plaintiffs in those cases, or in any other
filed case, adequately answered discovery concerning their allegations
that the defendants caused their injuries. 30 After the supreme court's rul-
ing, the plaintiffs gradually provided the defendants with causation infor-
mation to support their claims, including estimates of the amounts of the
defendant's toxins to which the plaintiffs were exposed, as required by
the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores.31
The trial court severed and set for imminent trial the claims of one plain-
tiff, Guadalupe Garza, who provided the most detailed responses to the
23. Id. at 2207-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2212-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 2213 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S.
300, 309 n.6 (1995)).
27. Id.
28. See In re Allied Chem. Corp., 287 S.W.3d 115, 119-20 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2009, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
29. Brent M. Rosenthal, Misty A. Farris, Sharon D. Bautista & Renee M. Melancon,
Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 61 SMU L. REV. 1155, 1158-59 (2008).
30. In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 656-59 (Tex. 2007).
31. 232 S.W.3d 765, 772-73 (Tex. 2007).
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defendants' discovery requests on causation. The defendants filed man-
damus petitions challenging the trial setting of the Garza case, the suffi-
ciency of the discovery responses both of Garza and of the non-trial
plaintiffs, and the refusal of the trial court to rule on motions for sum-
mary judgment by a defendant that was not identified in Garza's discov-
ery responses.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals granted the petitions in part and
denied them in part in In re Allied Chemical Corp.32 The court of appeals
held that the plaintiff, Garza, adequately informed the defendants both of
the identity of the chemicals and companies that injured her and the ap-
proximate dose of the chemicals to which she was exposed.33 Because
her responses to the defendants' discovery requests on causation were
adequate, the court of appeals determined that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in severing her case and setting it for trial.34 The
court of appeals rejected the defendants' argument that all plaintiffs were
required to file adequate discovery responses before any plaintiff's case
could go to trial, stating that it "cannot countenance" the suggestion that
the Texas Supreme Court intended that trial should be delayed until all of
the hundreds of plaintiffs identified their causation evidence.35 The court
of appeals added, however, that the trial court failed to require the non-
trial plaintiffs to disclose their product and exposure evidence within a
reasonable time, noting that "plaintiffs are not absolved of the responsi-
bility to timely provide adequate interrogatory responses merely because
their ranks are numerous." 36 The court of appeals also held that the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to rule on the motion for summary
judgment, and it ordered the trial court to do So.37 By allowing trial to
proceed in the Garza case, however, the court of appeals took another
metaphorical step in the thousand-mile journey of the Hayes-Sammons
"toxic soup" litigation.
C. LOCATION OF THE FORUM
The 2007 Survey reported on an unpublished order by Judge Mark Da-
vidson, the pretrial judge supervising the Texas multidistrict asbestos liti-
gation, declining to dismiss a case involving mesothelioma (a fatal cancer
caused by asbestos exposure) based on the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.38 The order was notable because Judge Davidson acknowledged
that the case had "absolutely no connection" with Texas, but added that
32. 287 S.W.3d at 120.
33. Id. at 127-28.
34. Id. at 128.
35. Id. at 128 n.10.
36. Id. at 130.
37. Id. at 131-32.
38. Brent M. Rosenthal, Misty A. Farris & Sharon D. Bautista, Toxic Torts and Mass
Torts, 60 SMU L. REv. 1345, 1349 (2007) (reporting on letter ruling in Richards v. Carver
Pump., No. 2006-22, 116 (11th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Sept. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.justex.net/Courts/Civil/CourtSection.aspxcrt=62&sid=244 (follow "ENC Rul-
ing" hyperlink).
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dismissal would not further "the interests of justice" because the case
would have been removable to federal court in its more appropriate fo-
rum.3 9 Noting the reputation of the federal MDL for asbestos litigation
as a "black hole" and the refusal of the moving defendants to agree not to
remove the case to federal court it were refiled in its proper jurisdiction,
Judge Davidson exercised his discretion to deny the motion to dismiss. 40
The Texas Supreme Court considered this order during the current Sur-
vey period in In re General Electric Co. 4 1 and concluded that Judge Da-
vidson abused his discretion in declining to dismiss the case.42 In an
opinion by Justice Johnson, the supreme court noted that following the
2003 amendments, the forum non conveniens statute now provides that a
trial court "shall" (not "may") dismiss a case if it finds that "in the inter-
est of justice" and "for the convenience of the parties" another forum
would more properly hear a case. The amended statute also provided
that a trial court "shall" (not "may") consider certain factors in deciding a
forum non conveniens motion.43 Responding to the plaintiff's contention
that this change in language should not change the result-after all, Judge
Davidson found that it would not serve the interest of justice to dismiss
the case-the supreme court insisted that by using the word "shall," the
legislature "essentially defined the terms 'interest of justice' and 'conve-
nience of the parties' as they are used" in the statute.44 In rejecting the
plaintiff's argument (and Judge Davidson's implication) that the federal
courts do not provide an adequate forum for victims of terminal asbestos
disease, the supreme court observed that complaints based on "compara-
tive analysis of procedural processes and times to trial" are "disfavored"
in a forum non conveniens analysis. 45 Noting that the factors specified in
the forum non conveniens statute all weighed in favor of dismissal, the
supreme court held that Judge Davidson's determination that "the inter-
est of justice" permitted denial of the forum non conveniens motion "vio-
lated the forum non conveniens statute and was an abuse of [his]
discretion," and it conditionally granted mandamus to compel dismissal
of the case.46
In recent years, the Fifth Circuit, like the Texas Supreme Court, has
indicated that mandamus is available to correct a trial court's erroneous
denial of a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. 47 But what if the court that denied the forum non conveniens
motion was not the district court from which the case was being appealed,
39. Letter ruling in Richards, supra note 38, at 1-2.
40. Id. at 2.
41. 271 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2008).
42. Id. at 684.
43. Id. at 686 (quoting TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 71.051(b) (Vernon 2008)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 688.
46. Id. at 685, 694.
47. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009) (granting mandamus to correct an erroneous denial of a
motion to change venue); In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Tex. 2007).
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but rather a court in another circuit that was charged with supervising
pretrial activity in that case and all similar litigation under the multidis-
trict litigation (MDL) statute? The Fifth Circuit confronted this situation
in In re Ford Motor Co.4 8 The plaintiffs were Mexican citizens who were
injured in Mexico when, they alleged, the Firestone tires on their Ford
sport utility vehicle failed. They sued Ford and Firestone in state court in
Texas, but their case was removed to federal court and then transferred to
the court in the Southern District of Indiana presiding over the Ford/
Firestone tire separation MDL litigation. This MDL court had previously
dismissed another case brought by Mexican citizens against Ford and
Firestone based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, basing its rul-
ing in part on its finding that an order of dismissal of a parallel case by a
Mexican court, offered by the plaintiffs to show the unavailability of a
Mexican forum for the case, was the product of manipulation and fraud.
But when Ford and Firestone moved for dismissal of the case at issue
based on forum non conveniens, the MDL court denied the motion, find-
ing that Mexico did not provide the plaintiffs with an adequate alterna-
tive forum.49 The MDL court then returned the case to federal district
court in Texas, where Ford and Firestone immediately moved the district
court for reconsideration of the MDL court's denial of their forum non
conveniens motion. The district court declined to disturb the MDL
court's denial of the forum non conveniens motion, observing that pre-
trial orders of an MDL court should be reconsidered, "if at all, under only
the most extraordinary circumstances," because to review such orders
"would go a long way toward defeating the entire purposes of the MDL
process."50 The district court held that this case presented no extraordi-
nary circumstances and that reconsideration was therefore
unwarranted.51
On Ford and Firestone's petition for mandamus relief from the denial
of the motion to reconsider, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that courts
and commentators were split on the degree of deference that should be
accorded to an MDL court's pretrial rulings. 5 2 The court noted that sev-
eral courts have adopted "a bright-line rule that a transferor court cannot
overrule a transferee court," while other courts "have advocated only
substantial deference to the transferee court." 53 The court found an ap-
propriate standard for review in the "law of the case" doctrine, which
provides that a court shall not revisit previously rendered orders absent a
change in evidence, a change in controlling legal principles, or a showing
that the order was "clearly erroneous" and would work "manifest injus-
tice." 54 Applying the "law of the case" standard, the Fifth Circuit ruled
48. 591 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2009), superseding 580 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2009).
49. In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d at 409.




54. Id. at 411-12.
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that the district court had clearly erred in refusing to reconsider the MDL
court's forum non conveniens decision, and that this error imposed mani-
fest injustice on Ford and Firestone.55 The court further held that the
harm suffered by Ford and Firestone-facing trial in an inconvenient and
inappropriate forum-could not be remedied by ordinary appeal. 56 The
court thus granted a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dis-
miss the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 57
In a pair of decisions issued the same day, the Houston Fourteenth
Court of Appeals reached different conclusions on whether the same de-
fendant could be brought into a Texas court to defend against claims
based on harm caused by exposure to silica. In the first decision,
Pulmosan Safety Equipment Corp. v. Lamb,58 the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's ruling that it could exercise specific jurisdiction
over a dissolved New York corporation that made and sold allegedly de-
fective protective equipment that contributed to the plaintiff's silicosis. 5 9
In the second decision, Moore v. Pulmosan Safety Equipment Corp.,60 the
court of appeals affirmed an order by the same trial court that it could
not exercise specific jurisdiction over the same defendant on a similar
type of claim.61 The rather obvious explanation for the different results is
that in Lamb, the plaintiff lived, used the defendant Pulmosan's product,
and developed the disease in Texas, while in Moore, the plaintiff lived,
encountered the Pulmosan product, and got sick in Louisiana. In Lamb,
the court of appeals held that the "operative facts of the litigation" oc-
curred in Texas, while in Moore, they did not.6 2 The Pulmosan cases
stand for propositions no more mysterious or complex than that different




The 2009 Survey reported that the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 6 3 "gave new hope" to those who want
courts to broadly interpret federal statutes and regulations to preempt
state common-law standards for imposing tort liability. 64 In this Survey
55. Id. at 412.
56. Id. at 416.
57. Id. at 417.
58. 273 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
59. Id. at 833.
60. 278 S.W.3d 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
61. Id. at 30.
62. Lamb, 273 S.W.3d at 839; Moore, 278 S.W.3d at 38.
63. 552 U.S. 312 (2009).
64. Brent M. Rosenthal, Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 62 SMU L. REv. 1483, 1491
(2009). In Riegel, the Court held that a product liability action against the manufacturer of
a cardiac catheter was effectively precluded by the Medical Device Act because the cathe-
ter had received pre-market approval by the Food and Drug Administration. 552 U.S. at
322-25.
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period, the Court's opinion in Wyeth v. Levine65 demonstrates that the
hope the Court giveth, the Court may taketh away. In Wyeth, plaintiff
Diana Levine developed gangrene and was forced to have her right arm
amputated due to an adverse reaction to the drug Phenergan, which a
nurse administered to her intravenously to treat her nausea caused by a
severe migraine headache. The label on Phenergan warned of the danger
of gangrene and amputation following inter-arterial injection, but Levine
argued that the labeling was defective because it failed to advise clinicians
to use the "IV-drip" method of intravenous administration instead of the
higher-risk "IV-push" method, which was the method that the nurse had
used on Levine. In its defense, Wyeth argued that because the federal
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the exact language of
the Phenergan label, a state-law claim predicated on the theory that Wy-
eth should have marketed Phenergan with a different, stronger warning,
conflicted with-and therefore was preempted by-federal law. State
courts, however, rejected Wyeth's preemption defense, and a jury
awarded damages to Levine under state product liability law. 6 6 The
United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.67
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the state-court
judgment, holding that Wyeth's compliance with federal regulations did
not preempt Levine's state-law claim.68 In a majority opinion by Justice
Stevens, the Court first rejected Wyeth's contention that the FDA regula-
tions made it impossible to provide the type of warning that the state-
court jury effectively required through its verdict.69 The Court noted that
the federal regulations permitted Wyeth to strengthen its label based on
new data or on new analysis of existing data, as long as it filed a supple-
mental application with the FDA. The Court concluded that it would not
find that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with both state and fed-
eral requirements "absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have
approved a change to Phenergan's label," 70 evidence that was not
presented in this case. Next, the Court rejected Wyeth's contention that
imposing liability on Wyeth for failing to provide warnings stronger than
those required by the FDA frustrated the purposes and objectives of fed-
eral drug-labeling regulation.71 The Court disputed Wyeth's premise that
Congress intended to entrust to a federal agency, rather than to civil ju-
ries, decisions on the adequacy of drug labels, observing that "all evi-
dence of Congress'[s] purposes is to the contrary." 72 The Court gave no
deference to a regulatory preamble issued by the FDA in 2006 stating
that FDA approval of a drug warning "establishes both a 'floor' and a
65. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
66. Id. at 1191.
67. Wyeth v. Levine, 552 U.S. 1161 (2008).
68. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
69. Id. at 1196-99.
70. Id. at 1198.
71. Id. at 1199-1204.
72. Id. at 1199.
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'ceiling"' on the strength of the warning.73 The Court noted that the
FDA's "new position" 74 conflicted both with Congress's refusal to ex-
pressly preempt tort suits based on inadequate drug labels and with the
FDA's traditional view that "state law offers an additional, and impor-
tant, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA regulation."75
The four justices who did not join in Justice Stevens's majority opinion
presented sharply differing approaches to the process of determining
whether federal law displaces state tort standards. Justice Thomas issued
an opinion concurring in the judgment but expressing his opposition to
the majority's "implicit endorsement" of the concept that a state law or
standard is preempted if a court finds that it conflicts with "broad federal
policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congres-
sional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law." 76
Such reasoning, Justice Thomas explained, "facilitates freewheeling, ex-
tratextual, and broad evaluations of the 'purposes and objectives' embod-
ied within federal law," and "leads to decisions giving improperly broad
pre-emptive effect to judicially manufactured policies, rather than to the
statutory text."77 On the other side of the preemption spectrum, Justice
Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, dissented from
the decision upholding Levine's tort judgment, arguing that "[f]ederal law
. . . does rely on the FDA to make safety determinations like the one it
made here" and characterizing Levine's tort suit against Wyeth as "a
'frontal assault' on the FDA's regulatory regime for drug labeling."78 Af-
ter Wyeth v. Levine, the difficulty for practitioners in cases involving pre-
emption is not finding a coherent approach to the doctrine, but in
predicting which approach is likely to prevail.
While Wyeth v. Levine presented the issue of whether new, specific fed-
eral regulations preempt pre-existing, general state common-law stan-
dards of care, the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in In re GlobalSanteFe
Corp.79 considered the converse question: Do pre-existing, general rules
of federal common law preempt new, specific state laws governing tort
liability? The answer to that question, the supreme court concluded, de-
pends on whether the new state laws are characterized as procedural or
substantive.80 As reported in the 2006 Survey, the Texas Legislature in
2005 enacted new procedural and substantive requirements, now codified
in Chapter 90 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, for the
prosecution of claims seeking damages for physical harm caused by expo-
sure to asbestos and silica.81 These requirements include the obligation
73. Id. at 1200.
74. Id. at 1203.
75. Id. at 1202.
76. Id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 1218 (Alito, J., dissenting).
79. 275 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2008).
80. Id. at 485.
81. Brent M. Rosenthal, Misty A. Farris & Amanda R. Tyler, Toxic Torts and Mass
Torts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1579, 1580-83 (2006) (reporting on the enactment of Senate Bill 15,
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to serve a detailed medical report confirming the existence of asbestos- or
silica-related disease,82 the need to submit to transfer and consolidation
of the case with its respective docket created under the Texas multidistrict
litigation statute,83 and the demonstration of a specific, objectively ascer-
tainable level of impairment as a result of the alleged condition.8" In
GlobalSanteFe, the supreme court considered whether these statutory re-
quirements applied to a suit seeking compensation for silica-related dis-
ease sustained by a seaman from his work aboard ship, a suit which is
governed by federal law but can be brought in either state or federal
court.85 The MDL pretrial court held that the Jones Act, which governs
claims for maritime injuries, preempts Chapter 90 in its entirety, and re-
manded the suit to the district court where it had been filed.86
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Willett, the Texas Supreme Court
granted mandamus to compel the return of the case to the silica MDL
court, holding that the Jones Act preempts only the substantive, and not
the procedural, portions of the legislation.87 The supreme court noted
that the statute requiring timely, expert disclosure of the basis for alleging
a silica-related injury does not conflict with any rule or policy of federal
maritime law.8 8 Similarly, the portions of Chapter 90 directing "transfer
of silica-related cases to an MDL court . . . do[ ] not work material
prejudice to a characteristic feature of maritime law" and thus are not
preempted.89 Because "[t]he Jones Act imposes no requirement for a
minimum threshold of physical injury," however, the Texas statute requir-
ing that a plaintiff demonstrate a specific level of impairment from a sil-
ica-related disease "cannot be applied to Jones Act claims." 90 Under
GlobalSanteFe, plaintiffs seeking compensation for injuries sustained
aboard a ship need not satisfy the medical criteria in Chapter 90 to re-
cover damages. 91
B. CAUSATION
In City of San Antonio v. Pollock,92 the Texas Supreme Court's new
willingness to scrutinize scientific expert testimony for its legal sufficiency
to support a causation finding was on display. The Pollocks alleged that
that their daughter Sarah's leukemia was caused by her exposure in utero
to benzene emanating from an old landfill maintained by the City of San
Act of May 16, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 1, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 169, 169-70
(Vernon)).
82. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 90.004 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
83. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 90.010(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
84. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 90.004(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
85. GlobalSantaFe, 275 S.W.3d at 484-87.
86. Id. at 482.
87. Id. at 479, 485.
88. Id. at 486-88.
89. Id. at 489.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009).
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Antonio, and they sought damages from the City. One of the Pollocks'
experts, an engineer with experience in landfill management, testified
that in his opinion, benzene from the City's landfill entered the Pollocks'
property "on a regular basis."93 Although he could not estimate the con-
centration of benzene that actually entered the property, he testified
without objection that a sealed well on the landfill located near the Pol-
locks' property contained benzene in concentrations of at least 160 parts
per billion during the time in question. From this he concluded that "the
Pollocks were exposed to gas levels like that in the sealed well." 94 Rely-
ing on the engineer's testimony regarding exposure and on medical litera-
ture showing increased rates of cancer in workers occupationally exposed
to benzene, an oncologist testified that Sarah's exposure to benzene
caused her leukemia. From all of the evidence, the jury found for the
Pollocks and awarded them sizable compensatory damages for Sarah's
leukemia and for diminution in property value, and it also awarded exem-
plary damages. 95 The court of appeals struck the punitive award but af-
firmed the compensatory component of the judgment. 96
In an opinion authored by Justice Hecht, the supreme court reversed
and rendered judgment for the City.9 7 The supreme court first acknowl-
edged that the City had not objected to the admission of the expert testi-
mony concerning causation, but held that this was not an obstacle to the
court's consideration of the legal sufficiency of the causation evidence.98
The supreme court distinguished between a challenge to expert testimony
as "unreliable"-such as a quarrel with the methodology of the expert-
which must be preserved by objection, and a challenge to expert opinion
as being "conclusory" or having "no basis," which need not be pre-
served.99 Turning to the case before it, the supreme court noted there
was "no basis in the record" for the engineer's assumption that the expo-
sure levels at the Pollock home were the same as those in the sealed well,
holding that the engineer's testimony to that effect "is the kind of naked
conclusion that cannot support a judgment."100 The supreme court also
found the oncologist's testimony of causation conclusory and legally in-
sufficient to support a judgment. 01 The supreme court noted that the
studies showing increased cancer rates in workers exposed to benzene all
involved exposures of far greater concentrations than those experienced
by the Pollocks. "Given this large gap between the exposure levels," the
supreme court concluded that the studies "provide no basis for his opin-
ion that the Pollocks' claimed benzene exposure caused Sarah's
93. Id. at 814.
94. Id. at 818.
95. Id. at 815.
96. Id. at 815.
97. Id. at 811-12.
98. Id. at 816.
99. Id. at 817-18.
100. Id. at 819.
101. Id. at 820.
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[leukemia]."1 0 2
Justice Medina, joined by Justice O'Neill, dissented, arguing that the
City waived its complaints about deficiencies in the expert testimony of
causation by failing to object at trial.103 Justice Medina acknowledged
the distinction between conclusory and unreliable expert testimony but
concluded that the City's objections to the Pollocks' causation evidence
was "nothing more than an unpreserved reliability challenge." 104 The
City had not plausibly suggested that the expert evidence had no basis,
but rather complained that "specific errors or omissions" in the expert's
analysis rendered the opinions "unreliable."' 05 By characterizing the
opinions of causation as "no evidence," Justice Medina wrote, the major-
ity erroneously and unfairly "assume[d] the role of gatekeeper ex post
facto."106 The result, Justice Medina added, "may encourage gamesman-
ship" at trial. "Why . . . make a reliability objection during trial and run
the risk that the proffering party may fix the problem, when the expert's
opinion can be picked apart for analytical gaps on appeal?"107
During the Survey period, the Texas appellate courts considered two
appeals from jury verdicts holding the pharmaceutical manufacturer
Merck liable for deaths allegedly caused by the once popular but now
discredited anti-inflammatory prescription drug Vioxx. 08 In Merck &
Co., Inc. v. Garza,109 the San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld the jury's
finding that the decedent Garza's heart attack and death were caused by
his use of Vioxx, despite Merck's contention that Garza's expert inade-
quately ruled out Garza's preexisting cardiovascular disease as the cause
of his death.1 0 The court of appeals noted that Garza was seventy-one
years old, overweight, had previously suffered a heart attack and under-
gone a quadruple bypass surgery long before taking Vioxx, had high
blood pressure and high cholesterol, and smoked cigarettes until the time
of his death."' But in holding the evidence legally sufficient to support
the jury finding of causation, the court of appeals also cited evidence that
a stress test completed shortly before Garza's death showed a "stable car-
diac status,"11 2 that the "rare" simultaneous formation of two blood clots
caused the heart attack,113 and that "the formation of clots is the type of
problem caused by Vioxx."11 4 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, Mrs.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 822 (Medina, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 828 (Medina, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Medina, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 822 (Medina, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 829 (Medina, J., dissenting).
108. See Merek & Co. v. Garza, 277 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet.
granted); Merek & Co. v. Ernst, 296 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet.
filed).
109. 277 S.W.3d 430.
110. Id. at 437.
111. Id. at 436.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 437.
114. Id. at 436, 437.
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Garza, the court of appeals held that jury misconduct tainted the verdict
based on evidence that one of the jurors previously received several inter-
est-free loans from Mrs. Garza herself.115 The court of appeals thus re-
manded the case for a new trial."i6
In contrast, in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Ernst,117 the Houston Fourteenth
Court of Appeals held the evidence legally insufficient to support the
jury's finding that decedent Ernst's ingestion of Vioxx caused his sudden
cardiac death.118 The court of appeals acknowledged evidence that Vioxx
could cause a "thrombotic cardiovascular event" (heart attack due to a
blood clot), 119 but it noted that the autopsy conducted on Ernst found no
evidence of a blood clot. The court of appeals dismissed theories that the
clot could have dissolved or become dislodged as "mere speculation," 1 2 0
and it discounted the plaintiff's exclusion of other risk factors for Ernst's
fatal heart attack with the inscrutable observation that the "exclusion of
risk factors . . . does not equate to the exclusion of causes." 121 The court
of appeals thus reversed the plaintiff's judgment and rendered judgment
for Merck. 122 Undoubtedly, the next Survey will have more to report on
the Vioxx litigation in Texas.
C. COMPENSABLE HARM
The United States Supreme Court rarely engages in the relatively mun-
dane tasks of defining the scope of common-law tort liability and design-
ing procedures for ensuring that the proper scope of liability is not
exceeded. Those functions typically fall to the state courts of last resort.
But in cases involving injuries sustained on the high seas or while in the
employ of an interstate railroad, Congress has effectively designated the
Supreme Court as the ultimate authority on such matters.123 In CSX
Transportation, Inc. v. Hensley,124 the Supreme Court exercised that au-
thority in reversing a $5 million verdict awarded by a Tennessee state-
court jury to a plaintiff who claimed that he developed asbestosis and
other diseases while employed by a railroad.125 The plaintiff asked the
jury, in calculating damages, to consider the plaintiff's fear of contracting
115. Id. at 440-42.
116. Id.
117. 296 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. filed).
118. Id. at 99-100.
119. Id. at 96 n.7.
120. Id. at 97.
121. Id. at 99.
122. Id. at 100.
123. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Corp. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2626-27 (2008) (responsi-
bility for determining the degree to which punitive damages should be regulated under
maritime common law "lies with this Court as a source of judge-made law in the absence of
statute"); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 145 (2003) (the Court's duty in
cases brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60) for injuries
sustained in the course of railroad work "is to develop a federal common law of negligence
under FELA, informed by reference to the evolving common law" (quoting Consol. Rail
Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 558 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring))).
124. 129 S. Ct. 2139 (2009).
125. Id. at 2140, 2142.
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lung cancer in the future caused by his asbestos exposure. The trial court
rejected the defendant's request for an instruction that the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the "fear is genuine and serious" to recover damages. 126
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's
refusal to give such an instruction was reversible error.127 The Court re-
lied on its 2003 opinion in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers,128 in
which the Court held that a plaintiff who had asbestosis but not cancer
could recover from his fear of cancer only if the plaintiff could "prove
that his alleged fear is genuine and serious."129 The Court pointed out
that in allowing damages for "genuine and serious" fear of cancer, the
Ayers Court "struck a delicate balance between plaintiffs and defend-
ants . . . against the backdrop of systemic difficulties posed by the ele-
phantine mass of asbestos cases,"130 and noted that "[j]ury instructions
stating the proper standard for fear-of-cancer damages were part of that
balance."131 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens disputed the major-
ity's premise that by listing a "genuine-and-serious" jury instruction as a
possible verdict-control device, the Ayers Court indicated "that a court's
decision not to give the instruction would be treated as per se reversible
error."132 He further noted that it is "hard to believe the jury would have
awarded any damages for Hensley's fear of cancer if it did not believe
that fear to be genuine and serious."133
D. LIABILITY OF PREMISES OWNERS AND EMPLOYERS
As manufacturers of asbestos products have sought refuge from tort
claims in the bankruptcy courts,134 victims of asbestos-related diseases
have turned to premises owners, employers, and other users of asbestos
products for compensation for their injuries. Consequently, courts must
consider whether Texas law supports the imposition of liability on these
users. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Smith,135 the Houston First Court of
Appeals reversed a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of a pipefit-
ter, Oliver Smith, who developed mesothelioma after working on the
premises of the two defendants.136 One of the defendants, Union Car-
bide Corporation, argued on appeal that the evidence was legally insuffi-
cient to support the jury's finding that Union Carbide controlled the
details of Smith's work, as is required to impose liability on a premises
126. Id. at 2140.
127. Id. at 2141.
128. 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
129. Hensley, 129 S. Ct. at 2140 (quoting Ayers, 538 U.S. at 157).
130. Id. at 2142 (quoting Ayers, 538 U.S. at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2143 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2144 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. See supra Part I.A.
135. No. 01-08-00641-CV, 2009 WL 3152138 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 1,
2009, pet. filed).
136. Id. at *1.
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owner for injuries sustained by an independent contractor. 37 The other
defendant, Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc., a successor-in-interest to
one of Smith's employers, contended that it was immune from liability
under the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensa-
tion Act.138 The court of appeals agreed with both defendants. 139 The
court first rejected Smith's contention that Union Carbide "controlled the
manner" in which Smith performed his work by sending workers into
Smith's vicinity who worked with asbestos-containing insulation, finding
no evidence that Union Carbide employed the installers or otherwise
controlled the performance of their installation work. 140 The court of ap-
peals also rejected Smith's argument that Union Carbide assumed a duty
to Smith by providing him with asbestos-containing gaskets to install,
holding no evidence supported that "Union Carbide retained or exercised
any control over the manner in which [Smith] performed his work."141
Turning to Smith's claim against Hexion, the court of appeals noted that
Hexion's predecessor, which employed Smith, did not carry workers'
compensation insurance. But the court of appeals held that when Hexion
acquired the predecessor and provided workers' compensation coverage
to Smith, it became shielded from tort liability even for that part of
Smith's harm caused by Hexion's uninsured predecessor. 142 The court of
appeals declined to adopt Smith's "dual-persona" theory, under which
Hexion enjoyed immunity for the acts it committed while insured but not
for acts committed by its uninsured predecessor, noting "no authority in
Texas for applying the dual-persona doctrine under these
circumstances."1 4 3
Under a long-recognized quirk in Texas law, the survivors of an em-
ployee that has sustained a fatal work-related injury due to the gross neg-
ligence of his employer may sue the employer for exemplary damages,
even though the employer is immune from liability under the exclusive
remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.14 4 The right
to recover such damages was long thought to be guaranteed by the Texas
constitution.14 5 But even constitutional rights can be waived, and in Ross
v. Union Carbide Corp.,146 the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals
ruled that a release from liability executed by a worker in favor of his
employer precluded his survivors from pursuing a claim for exemplary
137. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.003 (Vernon 2005).
138. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (Vernon 2006).
139. Union Carbide, 2009 WL 3152138, at *1.
140. Id. at *4.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *8.
143. Id. at *10.
144. See, e.g., Smith v. Atl. Richfield Co., 927 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. Fuller, 892 S.W.2d 848, 852-53
& n.4 (Tex. 1995) (describing the constitutional provision that gave rise to this quirk as
"unique").
145. Smith, 927 S.W.2d at 87-88.
146. 296 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. filed).
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damages against the employer upon the worker's death. 14 7 The worker
had settled a claim for asbestos-related injuries in 1989 with several man-
ufacturers, and in exchange for the settlement, the worker signed a com-
prehensive release in favor of a larger group of companies, one of which
happened to be his employer, Union Carbide. When the worker died in
2001, his survivors brought a gross negligence claim for exemplary dam-
ages against Union Carbide, which invoked the release as a defense. The
survivors contended that the Texas constitution conferred the claim for
exemplary damages not on the worker but on his survivors, and could not
be released by the worker because "one cannot sell what one does not
own." 148 The survivors also argued that the release was unenforceable
because it was unconscionable and the product of unilateral mistake. The
Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, rejected these ar-
guments. 149 The court of appeals held that an action for exemplary dam-
ages against a decedent's employer must be "asserted through the
Wrongful Death Act, not separately from it," and is therefore subject to
the defense of release by pre-death contract.150 In so holding, the court
of appeals expressly overruled its prior decision in Perez v. Todd Ship-
yards Corp.,'15 in which it held that an exemplary damages claim brought
by a worker's survivors was not derivative of the worker's claim during
his lifetime which had been discharged in the employer's bankruptcy. 152
The court of appeals also rejected the survivors' arguments that because
the release was inadvertent and because Union Carbide itself paid no
money in the settlement, the release was unenforceable. 5 3 The court of
appeals cited the extensive release language and the fact that counsel rep-
resented the worker as support for its conclusion.' 5 4 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Frost argued that it was not necessary to convene an en
banc panel to overrule Perez, as that decision was clearly incompatible
with precedent of the Texas Supreme Court.155 Senior Justice Price con-
curred "reluctantly," expressing concern that "the Ross children had no
input whatsoever in the release of their claims." 5 6
III. CONCLUSION
It seems that at the very moment that one is prepared to pronounce the
death of mass tort litigation, a new potential mass tort grabs the nation's
attention. Recent months saw the emergence of litigation involving
147. Id. at 208-09.
148. Id. at 212.
149. Id. at 213.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 214-16; 999 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999), pet. denied,
35 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2000).
152. Perez, 999 S.W.2d at 35.
153. Ross, 296 S.W.3d at 219-21.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 221 (Frost, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 223, 225 (Price, S.J., concurring).
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Toyota vehicles that could accelerate without prompting or notice,' 5 7 de-
fective Chinese drywall materials used in thousands of homes,158 and
even serious personal injuries allegedly caused by the use of denture
cream.15 9 As long as Texans use chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and other
mass-produced products, the substantive law governing liability for harm
caused by such products, and the procedures available for managing mass
litigation, will continue to warrant study by the academy, the bench, and
the bar.
157. Miriam Rozen, Texas Plaintiffs Bar Eyeing and Filing Litigation Against Toyota,
TEXAS LAWYER, Feb. 8, 2010, at 5.
158. In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 1346
(J.P.M.L. 2009).
159. In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2009).
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